
There is an old coaching maxim, still heard on Sunday league touchlines, that the manager is responsible for the defence and everything else is up to the players. A coach should be judged by how organised his team is at the back rather than how flamboyantly it attacks. Teams built that way tend to overachieve.
Apply that test to Premier League managers, and in the summer of 2013 it was fair to wonder what Everton had seen in Roberto Martínez.
The Wigan paradox
Martínez left Wigan Athletic as the most unusual manager in English football: an FA Cup winner who had just been relegated. In May 2013 his side beat Manchester City 1–0 at Wembley, Ben Watson heading the winner in stoppage time, and three days later a defeat at Arsenal confirmed they would go down.
Wigan's attacking play under him had flair beyond what anyone expected from a team at the wrong end of the table. In defence, though, they were often a mess. They had outscored seven of the other sides in the bottom half and still been relegated, which spoke volumes about the cost of every lapse in concentration.
It was not a new problem. Wigan had conceded more than 60 league goals in each of the previous four seasons, and in 2009–10 they let in 79 yet somehow finished six points clear of the drop zone.

So what had Martínez been doing? Goals conceded affect league position at least as much as goals scored, and his defence had been among the easiest in the league to breach. Two explanations stood out. Either he could not find solid, ball-playing defenders on the money available, or he could not mould a reliable unit from decent players. The generous reading was the first: he had a tight budget and a clear idea of how he wanted to play, and when it worked it was special. Balancing attack and defence was the part he had not mastered.
A gamble for Bill Kenwright
That made his appointment at Goodison Park a genuine risk. Under David Moyes, Everton had conceded 45, 40 and 40 goals in the previous three campaigns, while their scoring had been patchy. Bringing a manager who struggled to defend to a team that struggled to score was a big gamble for chairman Bill Kenwright. It could work beautifully if the side started firing at both ends. On the old maxim, it was more likely to go wrong.
Mark Hughes at Stoke
Stoke City's choice to succeed Tony Pulis drew an even sharper reaction. Mark Hughes had won 41% of his 17 league games at Manchester City in 2009–10, compared with 52% from Roberto Mancini's 21 games after him, albeit with a few additions to the squad. City conceded 27 of their 45 league goals that season in Hughes's 17 matches, a rate that would have meant about 60 over a full campaign.
His spell at Queens Park Rangers was worse. He won 24% of his games there, including none of the first 12 league games of 2012–13, with a squad assembled at great expense. Stoke supporters were entitled to ask why a mid-table side was being handed to a manager who had not, in three jobs since leaving Blackburn Rovers, shown much evidence of success. The argument rumbled on across Twitter all summer.
What happened next
Both men proved the doubters wrong, at least for a while. Everton finished fifth in Martínez's first season with 72 points, their best Premier League total at the time, and conceded only 39 goals. The defensive concerns returned over the following two seasons, and he was sacked in May 2016. He then took charge of Belgium, leading them to third place at the 2018 World Cup, and later Portugal.
Hughes, meanwhile, steered Stoke to ninth place in three consecutive seasons, with a more expansive style than under Pulis and signings such as Xherdan Shaqiri, Bojan Krkić and Marko Arnautović. He was dismissed in January 2018 as the club slid towards relegation.
It is a reminder that managerial appointments are rarely as predictable as the statistics suggest, a theme that runs through the Championship's revolving door and debates such as Reading's difficult dismissal. For a lighter look at the Welshman's methods, there is always a day in the life of Mark Hughes.