
South America has fine football nations beyond the two giants. Uruguay, Chile and Paraguay all produce excellent teams. But there really is a Big Two on the continent, and then everybody else. Argentina and Brazil have the bigger and more successful clubs, produce and export more players and reach the latter stages of World Cups more often than anyone around them.
A list of players left out of their squads for the 2011 Copa América in Argentina makes the point better than any statistic. Hulk, Ronaldinho, Kaká, Luís Fabiano, Marcelo, Diego, Nilmar, Alex and Júlio Baptista for Brazil; Lisandro López, Javier Saviola, Lucho González, Pablo Aimar, Andrés D'Alessandro and Nicolás Otamendi for Argentina. Almost every one of them would have walked into any other starting XI in South America. There were plenty more.
No other part of the world had depth of quality like it. The previous two Copa América finals had been Brazil against Argentina, and most observers assumed the 2011 final would be the same.
Argentina: a superpower without a trophy
Going into the tournament, Argentina had not won a senior international title since the 1993 Copa América. Given the players and teams they had produced in the 18 years since, the drought was staggering.
And in Argentina it mattered more than almost anywhere. The clichés are true: football is close to a religion there, part of the fabric of everyday life, always on television, in the papers and in conversation. For the thousands of tourists who pass through Buenos Aires, arguably the greatest football city on earth with dozens of clubs and generations of history, a trip to see Boca Juniors or River Plate is part of the experience. Argentine clubs were still winning in South America, with Estudiantes lifting the Copa Libertadores in 2009 and Independiente the Copa Sudamericana in 2010. The national team, for all its stars, lovely football and air of footballing royalty, needed silverware.
There had been plenty in the past. Argentina won the World Cup at home in 1978 with César Luis Menotti's short-passing, attacking side led by Mario Kempes and Daniel Passarella, and again in Mexico in 1986, when Diego Maradona made a strong claim to be the greatest player of all time by carrying Carlos Bilardo's team to the title almost single-handed. They had 14 Copa América titles, most of them between the 1920s and the 1950s, with 1991 and 1993 the most recent. Add Olympic gold for the under-23 side in 2004 and 2008, and the picture was of an undoubted superpower in urgent need of a senior trophy.
So near, so often
They had come close. Losing the two previous Copa finals to Brazil said something about the volatile chemistry between the two nations, and about a growing Argentine inferiority complex in the fixture. In Peru in 2004, Marcelo Bielsa's side dominated much of the final and led as the clock ran down, only for Adriano to equalise in the last seconds. In the shoot-out D'Alessandro and Gabriel Heinze missed Argentina's first two kicks, Brazil scored all theirs, and Argentina went home empty-handed.
In Venezuela in 2007, Alfio Basile's team played sparkling, short-passing football all the way to the final, orchestrated by the genius of Juan Román Riquelme. There they met a pragmatic, physical Brazil side under Dunga, without several of its biggest names, which pressed, fouled and counter-attacked its way to a humiliating 3–0 win.
Much of that same Argentina team, under José Pékerman, had played the best football of the 2006 World Cup in Germany. Everyone remembers the 6–0 demolition of Serbia and Montenegro, and above all Esteban Cambiasso's goal at the end of a move of more than 20 passes. Yet they went out on penalties to the hosts in the quarter-finals, after Pékerman replaced a dominant Riquelme with Argentina in front and in control, a decision still argued over in Buenos Aires.
Then came Maradona's chaotic spell as coach, which featured a public row with Riquelme, dozens of players called up for meaningless friendlies and another World Cup quarter-final exit to Germany in 2010. This time it was a harrowing and deserved 4–0 defeat in Cape Town, and Maradona's tactics and selection were heavily criticised afterwards.

Sergio Batista and the Messi question
Maradona was replaced by Sergio Batista, his team-mate from the 1986 and 1990 World Cups. Batista had been successful with Argentina's youth teams, leading the under-23s to Olympic gold in Beijing in 2008 with Riquelme and Javier Mascherano as over-age players. A spell as caretaker was judged a success, not least because it included a stylish 4–1 win over world champions Spain in Buenos Aires in September 2010, and he was given the job full-time. He knew many of the younger players from the youth sides. He had also inherited some significant problems.
The biggest was how to get the best out of Lionel Messi. In Argentina he was seen differently than in Europe. His move to Barcelona as a boy made him, to some, a "Catalan", and the fact that he had never played for an Argentine club was viewed almost with suspicion. He was not loved in the way Carlos Tevez, Boca Juniors icon and man of the people, was loved. But his talent was undeniable, and the national team needed to serve it the way Barcelona did if they were to win anything.
Batista's predecessors had tried different solutions. Pékerman and Basile both had to fit Messi alongside Riquelme, so he was kept on the wing while the Boca playmaker ran the game as the number 10 in the centre. Batista did something similar at the Olympics, though Messi was encouraged to drift inside and combine with Riquelme, with good results. Maradona preferred a 4-4-2 with Messi at the tip of a midfield diamond, in the enganche role Riquelme had once filled, but his other selections undermined the plan and left La Pulga isolated and frustrated in big games, especially against Germany.
Batista opted instead for a 4-3-3 with Messi as a false nine, front and centre, the role in which he was destroying defences for Barcelona. There he could stay close to the penalty area for his sudden darting runs and quick combinations, but also drop deeper and drag defenders with him in search of the ball. At the time he had 16 goals in 56 internationals, a modest return for a player of his gifts and one that the new system was designed to improve.
Lavezzi, Di María and a bench full of strikers
On the flanks Batista seemed to have settled on Ezequiel Lavezzi of Napoli and Ángel Di María of Real Madrid, both quick, direct and hungry for goals, both able to beat a full-back and both apparently on Messi's wavelength. The bench was stacked with forwards: Tevez, Gonzalo Higuaín, Diego Milito and Sergio Agüero, each offering something different, from Tevez's energy and incisive dribbling and Higuaín's movement and heading to Milito's strength in holding the ball up and Agüero's intelligence and sublime technique in front of goal. If Argentina could get the ball to those players, they would score.
That was easier said than done. Batista liked the solidity of three defensive-minded midfielders, relying on Messi to link, create and finish.
Mascherano, Banega and Cambiasso
The base of the midfield was Mascherano, arguably the best holding player in the world at the time: aggressive in his pressing and tackling, positionally disciplined and calm and accurate on the ball. His first season at all-conquering Barcelona had added new skills, since Pep Guardiola had used the national captain at centre-back and as a stand-in for Sergio Busquets, teaching him to adapt his role. In South Africa a year earlier he had often been overrun in midfield, and even he could not cope against Germany.
That had been down to the players around him. Juan Sebastián Verón could still control possession but had lost the mobility of his prime, and when he was left out Mascherano found Maxi Rodríguez and Di María beside him. Both were fine footballers, neither particularly strong defensively, and their attacking runs left huge gaps for Mexico and Germany to exploit.
Batista's answer was Valencia's Éver Banega as the most advanced of the three, with Inter's Cambiasso as first choice for the other place. Banega was an all-rounder who had emerged in the number five role at Boca as a teenager but could play further forward. His passing was superb. He was always available, varied his touches, rarely gave the ball away and was capable of some silky football, but he also worked tirelessly to track back and defend. His understanding with Messi in recent friendlies had been a joy. Cambiasso was similar in work rate and ball retention, slightly more defensive in outlook, and alongside Mascherano the trio looked formidable.
If Batista needed more creativity, Javier Pastore of Palermo waited in reserve. He was the closest thing the squad had to a classic Argentine playmaker, and the idea of his pace and trickery combined with Banega's passing and Messi's genius was mouth-watering, though most expected to see it only if Batista grew desperate. Fernando Gago of Real Madrid and Anderlecht's Lucas Biglia, both hard-working and technically sound, were the likeliest replacements for the first-choice trio. Diego Valeri of Lanús and Enzo Pérez, just sold by Estudiantes to Benfica, were the attacking options left out when the squad was cut from 26 to 23.
The defensive problem
Defence had long been Argentina's weakness, which explained the heavy midfield. Without the injured Walter Samuel, there was no outstanding centre-back, and Batista generally preferred experience to promising youngsters. Nicolás Pareja of Spartak Moscow would start if fit; if not, the pairing was likely to be Roma's Nicolás Burdisso and Barcelona's Gabriel Milito. Both were 30, with 78 caps between them, good readers of the game, strong in the air and the tackle and comfortable bringing the ball out. Neither was quick, and the fear was that the likes of Neymar and Radamel Falcao could panic them with pace.
The same applied on the right, where the legendary Javier Zanetti, approaching his 38th birthday, would cover the flank tirelessly, creating chances and leading by example as he added to his 141 caps. His weakness, too, was pace, a real problem for a full-back, however wily "Pupi" remained. On the left, young Marcos Rojo of Spartak was quick, adventurous and level-headed enough that problems seemed more likely elsewhere, unless opponents targeted his inexperience. Pablo Zabaleta of Manchester City could cover either flank with efficiency and steel, and Sergio Romero of AZ had grown into the role of first-choice goalkeeper.
Favourites with doubts
Argentina went into the tournament as favourites, on the strength of home advantage and the quality of the squad. They were expected to play scintillating football, score plenty and reach the later stages. But their defensive weaknesses might be exposed by tougher opponents, and the pressure of expectant home crowds could easily work against them. On the other hand, they had sparkling talent and a young man who was already the best player in the world and one of the greatest of all time. They could undoubtedly win it. The question was whether they would.
Brazil: winning as a requirement
Brazil, by contrast, simply expected to win. They were not even treating the tournament with total seriousness, viewing it partly as preparation for the 2014 World Cup they would host under enormous pressure.
That Brazil was the world's greatest football nation seemed beyond dispute. Five World Cups: 1958 and 1962 with the generation of Garrincha and Pelé; most gloriously 1970, when Pelé was joined by Jairzinho, Carlos Alberto and Rivellino; 1994, after a long drought, marshalled by Dunga and inspired by Romário; and 2002, with starring roles for Ronaldo, Rivaldo and Ronaldinho. Alongside them in the national hall of fame sits Telê Santana's 1982 side, which with Zico, Sócrates, Falcão, Cerezo and Éder played unforgettable football and won nothing.
They had won the Copa América eight times, four of them since 1997, with further titles in 1999, 2004 and 2007, a sign of how dominant Brazil had become on the continent.

That dominance was fitting. Brazil is by far the biggest country in South America, with a population of around 190 million at the time and a fast-growing economy. The domestic league reflected that new prosperity. Its giant clubs, among them Flamengo, Corinthians, São Paulo, Internacional and Santos, had begun to dominate the Copa Libertadores again, and Brazilian stars such as Ronaldinho, Fred, Elano and Luís Fabiano were leaving European giants to come home, attracted by wages that had once been unthinkable.
After Dunga
The national team should have been thriving too, but the Dunga years had been strange ones. Constantly criticised for his style, Dunga was nonetheless a successful coach. His side won the 2007 Copa América and the 2009 Confederations Cup before coming apart against an organised, determined Netherlands in the 2010 World Cup quarter-final.
There was nothing wrong with his approach in purely footballing terms. His team was well balanced, lethal on the counter and formidable in defence. But in an era when the world expected Brazil to play the beautiful game, when "joga bonito" had been sold by sportswear advertising and images of 1970 and 1982 shaped every expectation of the yellow shirt, his preference for solidity over flair disappointed many. Only winning the World Cup would have justified it, and when he failed he was replaced by Mano Menezes.
Menezes had enjoyed success with Grêmio and Corinthians, showing a good touch with big egos, an adventurous style and an easy way with the press. He believed in youth, having brought through Anderson and Lucas Leiva at Grêmio, and planned to build his attack around young players.
Pato, Robinho and Neymar
His first-choice front three in a loose 4-3-3 was Alexandre Pato and Robinho of Milan alongside Santos' Neymar. All three were extremely quick, could dribble and create their own chances, and finished well. Pato would play centrally, with Neymar and Robinho cutting in from the flanks and all three expected to interchange constantly. Fred, formerly of Lyon and now back home with Brazilian champions Fluminense, was the only other specialist striker, though Jadson of Shakhtar Donetsk, usually an attacking midfielder, could play further forward if needed.
Neymar was the rising star. Big European clubs were chasing him, he had scored in Santos' recent Copa Libertadores final win over Peñarol and he had three goals in his first three internationals. He was thrilling with the ball anywhere near the area. The doubts concerned his temperament: a tendency to go down easily and react to provocation could affect him in big games, and experienced, cynical defenders across the continent had surely noticed.
Ganso, the throwback
Just as exciting, and without the questions over attitude, was Neymar's Santos team-mate Paulo Henrique Ganso. He was a throwback to the Brazilian playmakers of earlier eras, recalling Raí or Falcão, or perhaps Riquelme with a little more pace: all elegance and lovely passing. A measure of his talent was the willingness in Brazil to hand him the team's creative duties after years in which playmakers had rarely been trusted. Only Kaká had regularly held the role between midfield and attack, largely thanks to his devastating pace; Ronaldinho had usually played wide, and Alex and Diego had barely featured.
The worry with Ganso was injury. He had suffered repeated problems over the previous year and had returned from several weeks out only for the second leg of the Libertadores final, in which he orchestrated much of Santos' attacking play. If he broke down, the likeliest beneficiary was Elano, back in Brazil with Santos after his spell in Europe, a versatile attacking midfielder, excellent at set pieces and, with 46 caps, a veteran by the standards of this young squad. The other options were Jadson, a revelation at Shakhtar, and the 18-year-old Lucas Moura of São Paulo, whose low centre of gravity let him run at back-pedalling defenders and whose vision created chances for others.
Hernanes left out, Lucas and Ramires in
One of the controversies of the squad was the omission of Lazio's excellent midfielder Hernanes. In Rome he played almost as a number 10 and was arguably the club's player of the season as they mounted an unlikely challenge near the top of Serie A. At São Paulo, though, he had been a deep-lying regista, and many hoped he could fill that role for Brazil with a more disciplined holder alongside. A red card for a high foot in a friendly against France ruined his chance, and Menezes opted instead for two orthodox screening midfielders.
Both were familiar to English supporters: Liverpool's Lucas Leiva and Chelsea's Ramires. Lucas was the more disciplined for his country, while Ramires broke forward and had scored two goals in 21 caps. Both had the pace, strength and intelligence for the role, and they were a more technically gifted pairing than Dunga's usual choice of the ageing Gilberto Silva and Felipe Melo, reflecting Menezes' belief in playing football all over the pitch.
The wall at the back
Tellingly, the part of the team Menezes changed least was Dunga's strength, the defence. The centre-backs came from the two Milan clubs: Inter's classy, dependable Lúcio, the captain, 33 years old with 97 caps, and Milan's Thiago Silva, a superb footballer with pace and anticipation. Together they looked an intimidating wall. The alternatives were Chelsea's more adventurous David Luiz and his former Benfica partner Luisão.
Barcelona's marauding Dani Alves had claimed the right-back place under Menezes, with Maicon still in the squad, and André Santos, who had played for Menezes at Corinthians and was now at Fenerbahçe, took the left. They guaranteed relentless attacks down the flanks. Inter's Júlio César was first-choice goalkeeper, still carrying the memory of the error against the Netherlands in South Africa but calm, assured and with the aura a great goalkeeper needs.
Brazil were expected to reach the final. Getting through their group was compulsory, with only Paraguay looking a potential obstacle, and they were expected to start with a thumping win over Venezuela. After that, few could see anyone stopping them before a meeting with Uruguay, Chile or Argentina in the later rounds. The Uruguayans in particular loved playing Brazil and had a good record against them, as anyone who remembers Uruguay's 1995 triumph will know.
What actually happened
Neither giant came close to the final. The tournament became one of the most surprising in the Copa's long history, and both fell in the quarter-finals on penalties.
Argentina's troubles began on the opening night in La Plata, where Bolivia, the supposed lambs to the slaughter, took the lead and Agüero needed a fine strike to salvage a 1–1 draw. A goalless draw with Colombia in Santa Fe followed amid jeers from the home crowd. Batista then changed the team, bringing in Agüero, Higuaín and Gago, and Argentina beat Costa Rica 3–0 with Messi at last looking at home. In the quarter-final in Santa Fe they met Uruguay. Higuaín equalised Diego Pérez's early goal and Uruguay finished with ten men, but the match went to penalties. Tevez's kick was saved by Fernando Muslera and Uruguay won the shoot-out 5–4. Within weeks Batista was gone.

Brazil were no better. They drew 0–0 with Venezuela, needed a late equaliser to draw 2–2 with Paraguay and only came alive in a 4–2 win over Ecuador in which Pato and Neymar scored twice each. In the quarter-final they met Paraguay again in La Plata, dominated for long spells and could not score. In the shoot-out, Elano, Thiago Silva, André Santos and Fred all missed. Brazil failed to convert a single penalty, perhaps the most extraordinary statistic of the tournament, and Paraguay went through 2–0.
Uruguay won the title, beating Paraguay 3–0 in the final at the Monumental in Buenos Aires on 24 July. Luis Suárez scored the first and Diego Forlán added two more. It was Uruguay's 15th Copa América, taking them one clear of Argentina as the most successful nation in the competition's history. Paraguay, remarkably, had reached the final without winning a single match in normal time.
The long road afterwards
Argentina's drought went on for another decade. Alejandro Sabella took them to the 2014 World Cup final, lost to Germany in extra time in Rio de Janeiro, and they then lost the Copa América finals of 2015 and 2016 to Chile, both on penalties. The trophy finally came in 2021, when Argentina beat Brazil 1–0 at the Maracanã in the Copa América final, Di María scoring the winner. In December 2022 Messi lifted the World Cup in Qatar, and Argentina retained the Copa América in 2024. The player once regarded with suspicion at home became the national hero the 2011 preview suggested he deserved to be.
Brazil's 2014 World Cup ended in the 7–1 semi-final defeat by Germany in Belo Horizonte, the darkest night in the country's football history. Menezes had already been replaced by Luiz Felipe Scolari in 2012. Brazil did win the Copa América at home in 2019, but the generation of 2011 never delivered the World Cup the country craved. Neymar eventually overtook Pelé's goalscoring record for Brazil, while Lucas Moura scored the hat-trick in Amsterdam that took Tottenham to the 2019 Champions League final.
The rest of the 2011 preview series covered the minnows, Bolivia and Venezuela, the over-achievers, Paraguay and Ecuador, and the contenders, Uruguay and Chile, who between them provided the eventual champions and the side most expected to challenge them. For the many gifted Argentines who never got near Batista's squad, there is the story of Argentina's hidden Maradonas. More South American football writing could be found on GolGolGolGolGol and its accompanying Twitter page.
The giants went home early. Paraguay, the team that never won, went all the way to Buenos Aires.